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Curtailing Online Service Provider Immunity from 





Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)1 was 
enacted following the controversial decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Servs. Co., where an interactive computer service provider was 
held liable for a libelous message posted by a user on one of its financial 
message boards.2 The court determined that the service provider was a 
“publisher” of the libelous message for the purposes of state law because 
it had engaged in screening and moderating of other objectionable posts 
on its message boards but failed to remove the libelous message in 
question.3 Because the service provider voluntarily self-policed some of 
the user-generated content on its forum, the court held that the service 
provider assumed liability, in a manner akin to a newspaper publisher, for 
all messages on its bulletin board that defamed third parties.4 
The decision in Stratton affirmed that, by screening some of those 
posts, the service provider assumed liability for all content on its message 
board. The message board in question received over 60,000 posts a day.5 
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 1. Pub. L. No. 104–104, 79, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996)). 
 2. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 
1995) (superseded by statute). 
 3. Id. at *4 (“PRODIGY has uniquely arrogated to itself the role of determining what is proper 
for its members to post and read on its bulletin boards. Based on the foregoing, this Court is compelled 
to conclude that for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims in this action, PRODIGY is a publisher rather 
than a distributor.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at *3. 
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As one court opined, “[t]he amount of information communicated via 
interactive computer services is . . . staggering. The specter of tort liability 
in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It 
would be impossible for service providers to screen . . . for possible 
problems.”6 The same court recognized that because only service 
providers who voluntarily regulated at least some user-generated material 
risked subjecting themselves to liability, service providers could avoid 
liability by giving up moderating content altogether and simply acting as 
blind hosts.7 By dissuading service providers from hosting and moderating 
user-generated content, Stratton thus ran counter to the congressional goal 
of facilitating the growth of online services that Americans were becoming 
increasingly reliant upon for engagement with politics, education, culture, 
and entertainment.8 
Perturbed by the ramifications of imposing “tort liability on service 
providers for the communications of others[,]”9 Congress responded to 
Stratton by distinguishing the “provider or user of an interactive computer 
service” from the “publisher or speaker of any information” in § 230 of 
the CDA.10 To make this distinction clear, interactive computer service 
providers were given safe harbor from liability for the content generated 
by users of their services.11 Congress also extended this safe harbor to 
service providers who, like the defendant in Stratton, engaged in some 
degree of self-regulation.12 
Congress recognized that “interactive computer services offer a 
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for 
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”13 For 
that reason, Congress thought it was in the best interests of the United 
States to abstain from intrusive government regulation that might 
otherwise stifle the growth of the Internet as a “vibrant and competitive 
free market” of various types of information and services.14 
                                                     
 6. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 7. See id. 
 8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 230(a)–(b), 110 Stat. 56. 
 9. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 230(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56. 
 11. Id. (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”). 
 12. Id. § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable 
on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material . . . [or] any action taken to . . . make available to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material . . . .”). 
 13. Id. § 230(a)(3). 
 14. Id. § 230(b)(2). 
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Simultaneously, Congress sought to address concerns over the trend 
of obscene or otherwise objectionable content proliferating the Internet; 
namely, the lack of regulations on content accessible by children.15 
In response, Congress declared in § 230 that the policy of the United 
States would be to “remove disincentives for the development and 
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies” that could be employed 
by end users to screen material they deemed objectionable or 
inappropriate.16 Section 230’s purpose was to maximize user control over 
content, without regulating the existence of the content itself or forcing 
service providers to accept liability for the objectionable actions of third 
parties.17 As a result, the onus was placed on individuals, families, and 
schools to screen content that they deemed objectionable, especially as it 
pertained to children’s access to that content.18 
However, in the decades that followed the codification of § 230, the 
kinds of services that were available online continued to evolve, and 
§ 230’s safe harbor was interpreted broadly, to shield many different types 
of service providers from liability. This Note discusses one of the most 
notable contemporary challenges to broad § 230 immunity: the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC.19 Part I provides an overview of the way that § 230 
immunity has been applied in the absence of the Roommates.com holding. 
Part II summarizes the Roommates.com ruling and evaluates the approach 
taken by the Ninth Circuit in curtailing the broad application of § 230 
immunity while still preserving the congressional intent. Part III addresses 
some of the most pressing challenges to the Roommates.com holding and 
considers alternatives that have been suggested by other advocates. Part 
IV then makes a case that the extension of the Roommates.com holding is 
the most effective means of achieving the congressional goals of § 230. 
I. APPLICATION OF § 230 IMMUNITY 
Three elements are required for an entity to receive immunity from 
tort liability under § 230: “the defendant must be a provider or user of an 
‘interactive computer service’; the asserted claims must treat the defendant 
as a publisher or speaker of information; and the information must be 
provided by another ‘information content provider.’”20 
                                                     
 15. Id. § 230(b)(4). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id., § 230(b)(3). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 20. Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
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Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service” as “any 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and 
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions.”21 This definition has been applied to a number of 
contemporary online services, such as merchants,22 search engines,23 and 
web hosts.24 
However, immunity only extends to service providers and users 
insofar as they act as an intermediary for third-party content and does not 
apply when they act as information content providers themselves.25 
Section 230 defines an “information content provider” as “any person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.”26 
To this end, the courts provide some guidance for what types of 
conduct a provider or user of an interactive computer service may engage 
in without accepting liability as a publisher or speaker of third-party 
content. Archiving, caching, or simply providing access to offensive 
content posted by third parties does not transform a service provider into 
an information content provider.27 Additionally, efforts to self-regulate 
offensive third-party content will not burden service providers with 
liability, “even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even 
attempted.”28 
                                                     
 21. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012). 
 22. See, e.g., Schneider, 31 P.3d at 43 (holding that Amazon’s ability to edit third-party posts 
and claim licensing rights on the posted material did not transform Amazon into an information content 
provider: “Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service 
providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-
policing is unsuccessful or not even attempted. . . . Amazon was not a content provider under the 
allegations in Schneider’s complaint.”) (footnote omitted). 
 23. See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 242 F. 
App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that because Google only archived, cached, or simply provided 
access to defamatory content created by third parties, it was an interactive computer service and not 
an information content provider: “The defamatory statements . . . were created by users of USENET 
and other internet users . . . . Google cannot be held liable for the claims of defamation, invasion of 
privacy, and negligence alleged here.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a web host was 
immune from liability stemming from the publication of a defamatory message via his email listserv: 
“There is, however, no need here to decide whether a listserv or website itself fits the broad statutory 
definition of ‘interactive computer service,’ because the language of § 230(c)(1) confers immunity not 
just on ‘providers’ of such services, but also on ‘users’ of such services.”) (superseded by statute). 
 25. See id. 
 26. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012). 
 27. See, e.g., Parker, 422 F.Supp. 2d at 492. 
 28. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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II. ROOMMATES.COM: OVERVIEW 
While a service provider does not assume liability when it acts as a 
passive conduit for a facilitating a third party’s unlawful behavior,29 the 
Ninth Circuit has ruled that designing a service that actively facilitates 
illegal content or conduct violates the limitations of § 230 immunity, 
effectively transforming the service provider into an information content 
provider.30 
The website, Roommates.com,31 provided an online service 
“designed to match people renting out spare rooms with people looking 
for a place to live.”32 To accomplish this, Roommates.com asked users33 
to create a profile for the service, which required users to “disclose [their] 
sex, sexual orientation and whether [they] would bring children to a 
household . . . [as well as state their] preferences in roommates with 
respect to the same three criteria: sex, sexual orientation and whether they 
will bring children to the household.”34 Answers to these questions were 
not open-ended; users made a selection from drop-down menus,35 
populated by options provided by Roommates.com, to indicate their 
responses.36 This information was then used by the website’s search 
engine; a tool that “limit[ed] the listings available to subscribers based on 
sex, sexual orientation and presence of children” by hiding certain listings 
based on those stated attributes and preferences.37 
Secondarily, the site encouraged users to augment the information on 
their profiles with an “Additional Comments” section that allowed users 
to “[describe] themselves and their desired roommate in an open-ended 
essay.”38 Whereas, the initial profile creation obliged users to select 
                                                     
 29. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If Craigslist ‘causes’ the discriminatory notices, then so do phone 
companies and courier services . . . , yet no one could think that Microsoft and Dell are liable for 
‘causing’ discriminatory advertisements. . . . [The plaintiff] cannot sue the messenger just because the 
message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”). 
 30. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1157 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 31. “[T]he company goes by the singular name ‘Roommate.com, LLC’ but pluralizes its 
website’s URL.” Id. at 1161 n.2. 
 32. Id. at 1161. 
 33. The terms “users” and “subscribers” are used interchangeably in referring to people who 
utilize the services offered by Roommates.com. Id. at 1162. 
 34. Id. at 1161. 
 35. Drop-down menus, as they function here, allow a user to select answers to questions only 
from among options provided by the website. Id. at 1165 n.17. 
 36. Id. at 1165 (“For example, Roommate requires subscribers to specify . . . whether they are 
‘Male’ or ‘Female[,]’ . . . whether there are currently ‘Straight male(s),’ ‘Gay male(s),’ ‘Straight 
female(s)[,]’ or ‘Lesbian(s)’ living in the dwelling[,] . . . [and] whether they are willing to live with 
‘Straight or gay’ males, only with ‘Straight’ males, only with ‘Gay’ males or with ‘No males.’”). 
 37. Id. at 1169. 
 38. Id. at 1161. 
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responses to questions from a list of pre-constructed options, the 
“Additional Comments” section allowed users to input any information 
they wanted.39 
Plaintiffs sued in federal court, alleging that Roommates.com’s 
business violated the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA)40 and California 
housing discrimination laws.41 The district court held that 
Roommates.com was immune under § 230 of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c), which was the issue on appellate review.42 
The appellate court reversed the circuit court in part, holding that 
Roommates.com was liable for claims arising from (1) the obligatory 
components of profile creation and (2) the website’s search engine 
parameters.43 However, Roommates.com did qualify for § 230 immunity 
from liability arising from the “Additional Comments” section of the 
website.44 
A. Majority Opinion 
The appellate court emphasized the distinction that “[the grant of 
§ 230 immunity] applies only if the interactive computer service provider 
is not also an ‘information content provider,’ which is defined as someone 
who is ‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development 
of’ the offending content.”45 
The court recognized that “the term ‘develop’ could [be interpreted 
broadly.] . . . But to read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of 
[S]ection 230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section 
otherwise provides.”46 However, the court was also concerned that 
restricting the term “development” as applying “only to content that 
originates entirely with the website—as the dissent would seem to 
suggest—ignore[d] the words ‘development . . . in part’ in the [statute.]”47 
To strike a balance that granted § 230 immunity to “passive conduits” 
while leaving out genuine “co-developers” of content, the court interpreted 
the term “development” as referring “not merely to augmenting the 
content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged 
unlawfulness.”48 
                                                     
 39. Id. at 1174. 
 40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31 (1968). 
 41. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1169. 
 44. Id. at 1173–74. 
 45. Id. at 1162 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)).  
 46. Id. at 1167. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1167–68. 
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As such, the court held that Roommates.com was liable for claims 
arising from the profile creation and search engine components of its 
service because the cultivation and dissemination of the offensive material 
produced via these components was “a collaborative effort between 
Roommate and the [user].”49 The court noted that while the users 
themselves are obviously liable as content providers, this “does not 
preclude Roommate from also being an information content provider by 
helping ‘develop’ at least ‘in part’ the information in the profiles.”50 
In addressing why Roommates.com was liable for the basic profiles 
of its users, the court highlighted that users were obliged to identify their 
sex and sexual orientation (and preferences in prospective roommates or 
tenants) via “a limited set of pre-populated answers” that Roommates.com 
had curated.51 Therefore, in creating a profile that displayed discriminatory 
preferences, users were only responding to questions in a manner that 
Roommates.com expressly required for use of its service.52 Consequently, 
Roommates.com “[became] much more than a passive transmitter of 
information provided by others; it [became] the developer, at least in part, 
of that information.”53 
Meanwhile, the court also held that Roommates.com was liable for 
the effects of its search engine because its search engine “differs materially 
from generic search engines such as Google . . . in that Roommate 
designed its system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the 
results of each search, and to force users to participate in its discriminatory 
process.”54 In further distinguishing Roommates.com’s search engine 
from more generic engines, the court stated that “Roommate’s search is 
designed to make it more difficult or impossible for individuals with 
certain protected characteristics to find housing—something the law 
prohibits. By contrast, ordinary search engines do not use unlawful criteria 
to limit the scope of searches conducted on them[.]”55 
However, the court did grant § 230 immunity as it pertained to 
liability arising from the “Additional Comments” section of user profiles 
because that section “[came] entirely from subscribers” and was not 
influenced in any way by Roommates.com.56 Although the “Additional 
Comments” section of profiles often contained incredibly offensive and 
                                                     
 49. Id. at 1167. 
 50. Id. at 1165. 
 51. Id. at 1166. 
 52. Id. at 1161. 
 53. Id. at 1166. 
 54. Id. at 1167. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1173–74. 
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provocative language,57 Roommates.com did not “encourage or enhance 
any discriminatory content created by users”; instead, Roommates.com 
only offered a “simple, generic prompt” that users were free to answer in 
any manner.58 
B. Concerns of the Dissent 
In responding to the majority’s holding, the dissent in 
Roommates.com foremost characterized the majority as offering an 
“unprecedented expansion of liability for Internet service providers [that 
would threaten] to chill the robust development of the Internet[,]”59 setting 
the Ninth Circuit “apart from five [other] circuits, contravene[ing] 
congressional intent[,] and violat[ing] the spirit and serendipity of the 
Internet.”60 
In addition to taking issue with the majority’s apparent rogue 
expansion of liability for a number of service providers, the dissent 
criticized the majority for offering a confusing and inappropriate metric 
for deciding when a service provider has contributed materially to the 
illicit content in question.61 The dissent claimed that “the majority’s 
immunity analysis is built on substantive liability . . . depend[ing] on 
whether a webhost materially contributed to the unlawfulness of the 
information.”62 According to the dissent, this is the wrong inquiry, and the 
majority must first answer whether “substantive liability may be reached 
in the first place.”63 
Moreover, the dissent emphasized the impracticality of attempting to 
extend liability in the way described by the majority, noting that many 
“websites use prompts and drop-down menus . . . . Some of these sites are 
innocuous while others may not be. . . . But that is not the point. The 
majority’s definition of ‘development’ would [mean] . . . [v]irtually every 
site could be responsible in part for developing content.”64 Specifically, 
the dissent questioned the efficacy of the majority’s supposed carve out 
for providers of neutral tools, such as Google, noting that “Google is more 
than a match engine: it ranks search results, provides prompts beyond what 
                                                     
 57. Id. at 1173 (“Subscribers provide a variety of provocative, and often very revealing, answers. 
The contents range from subscribers who ‘[p]ref[er] white Male roommates’” to “those who are ‘NOT 
looking for black Muslims.’” (alterations in original)). 
 58. Id. at 1174. 
 59. Id. at 1176 (McKeown, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 1177. 
 61. Id. at 1176 (“[I]nteractive service providers [would be] left scratching their heads and 
wondering where immunity ends and liability begins.”). 
 62. Id. at 1182–83. 
 63. Id. at 1183. 
 64. Id. 
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the user enters, and answers questions. In contrast, 
Roommate . . . searches information and criteria provided by the user, not 
Roommate. It should be afforded no less protection than Google, Yahoo!, 
or other search engines.”65 
C. Majority Response and Clarification 
The majority rebut the dissent’s argument that the holding threatened 
to “chill the robust development of the Internet[,]”66 by reasoning that the 
interpretation of the term “develop” was not as broad and expansive as the 
dissent asserted.67 In response to the dissent’s attempt to construe the term 
“develop” to exclude service providers like Roommates.com from 
liability, the majority argued that “[t]he dissent makes no attempt to 
explain or offer examples as to how its interpretation of the statute leaves 
room for ‘development’ as a separate basis for a website to lose its 
immunity” despite being advised by the Supreme Court that redundancy 
or duplication of terms should be avoided whenever possible.68 
To further assuage the fears of the dissent, the majority articulated 
several examples of when a service provider does or does not “develop” 
content, at least in part, within the construction recognized by the Ninth 
Circuit.69 
First, when a third party uses “an ordinary search engine[, like 
Google,] to query for a ‘white roommate,’ the search engine has not 
contributed to any alleged unlawfulness in the individual’s conduct; 
providing neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit 
searches does not amount to ‘development’ for purposes of the immunity 
exception.”70 Roommates.com did not merely provide neutral tools in that 
its search engine was designed in a way to specifically reinforce and 
facilitate discriminatory renting, thereby contributing materially to the 
development of offensive content.71 
Second, “a dating [or other similar] website that requires users to 
enter their sex, race, religion and marital status through drop-down menus, 
and . . . [allows searches] along the same lines, retains its CDA immunity 
insofar as it does not contribute to any alleged illegality[.]”72 
                                                     
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1176. 
 67. Id. at 1168 (majority opinion). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1169. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1172 (“By sharp contrast, Roommate’s website is designed to force subscribers to 
divulge protected characteristics and discriminatory preferences, and to match those who have rooms 
with those who are looking for rooms based on criteria that appear to be prohibited by the FHA.”). 
 72. Id. at 1169. 
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Roommates.com failed to retain immunity because its drop-down menu 
options and searching criteria were alleged to have violated the FHA.73 
Third, “a housing website that allows users to specify whether they 
will or will not receive emails by means of user-defined criteria . . . [is] 
immune, so long as it does not require the use of discriminatory criteria.”74 
Again, Roommates.com required users to input discriminatory criteria in 
a user’s roommate preferences as a prerequisite for utilizing its service.75 
Finally, a website that “edits user-created content—such as by 
correcting spelling, removing obscenity or trimming for length—retains 
[its] immunity for any illegality in the user-created content, provided that 
the edits are unrelated to the illegality.”76 However, the court clarified that 
a website that edits third-party content in a manner that does contribute to 
the illegality of the content by “transform[ing] an innocent message into a 
libelous one[,] is directly involved in the alleged illegality and thus not 
immune.”77 Hence, Roommates.com was not liable for the “Additional 
Comments” portions of user profiles because it had not edited any third-
party content or provided guidelines to constrain what could be 
published.78 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO EXTENDING THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN 
ROOMMATES.COM 
Many advocates of broad § 230 immunity have questioned the 
viability of extending the majority holding in Roommates.com for fear that 
such an extension would curtail broad immunity at the expense of the 
status of the internet as an open platform for innovation. Several 
alternatives have been proposed that claim to better balance concerns of 
unchecked immunity without rendering § 230 wholly inefficacious, 
including: (1) the adoption of bad faith exceptions,79 (2) the 
reclassification of service providers based on whether or not they engage 
in business through the internet as distributors,80 and (3) the recognition 
                                                     
 73. Id. at 1172. 
 74. Id. at 1169 (second emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 1172. 
 76. Id. at 1169. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1173–74 (“Roommate publishes these comments as written. It does not provide any 
specific guidance as to what the essay should contain, nor does it urge subscribers to input 
discriminatory preferences. . . . This is precisely the kind of situation for which [S]ection 230 was 
designed to provide immunity.”). 
 79. See generally David Lukmire, Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency 
Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371 (2010). 
 80. See generally Joey Ou, Note, The Overexpansion of the Communications Decency Act Safe 
Harbor, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 455 (2013). 
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that § 230 only provides immunity insofar as the CDA does not conflict 
with the FHA or the stated purpose of the legislature.81 
A. Bad Faith Exception 
One author posits that an effective solution would be to create a bad 
faith exception that “would prevent websites and [internet service 
providers] from asserting [S]ection 230 immunity if they acted 
unreasonably in either posting or failing to remove defamatory content.”82 
The author supports this solution because “courts evaluating [S]ection 230 
claims usually refuse to inquire into the behavior of the Internet entity 
hosting allegedly defamatory content.”83 Although the author 
acknowledges that “subjective intent will often be implicit in a 
determination of a web entity’s acting in bad faith,” he asserts that “an 
objective bad faith standard is more comprehensive and easier to 
administer.”84 To this end, he proposes that we look to Wisconsin 
insurance law,85 where objective bad faith is analyzed under a 
reasonableness standard.86 He suggests that “adapted for purposes of 
defamation law,” a website or ISP could be held to act in bad faith if it 
“either allows defamatory content postings or fails to remove them once 
notified.”87 He further clarifies that “while this language sounds of 
negligence, the bad faith standard would rely on affirmative acts such as 
failure to remove an obviously defamatory posting, making the effective 
level of culpability higher[,]” allowing courts to  take a more holistic 
approach where they “apply this flexible standard based on all of the 
circumstances of the case before deciding whether the website or ISP is 
entitled to [S]ection 230 immunity.”88 
Applying this concept to Roommates.com, the author notes that “the 
court indicated that there are limits to the control that websites may have 
over third-party content if they are to claim [S]ection 230 
immunity. . . . Roommates suggests that courts may be willing to police 
the boundaries of [S]ection 230 immunity, and that a bad faith exception 
does not present a great doctrinal obstacle.”89 As such, sites like 
                                                     
 81. See generally Jennifer C. Chang, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implication 
of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2002). 
 82. Lukmire, supra note 79, at 407. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 408. 
 85. Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376–77 (Wis. 1978). “[B]ad faith can be 
alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a 
reasonable basis for denying the claim . . . . ” Id. at 377. 
 86. Lukmire, supra note 79, at 408. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 408–09. 
 89. Id. at 408. 
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Roommates.com would be held liable as bad faith actors if they “[seem] 
to invite defamatory content[,]” especially when the sites have “apparent 
awareness of the offending material.”90 
However, a bad faith standard is only efficacious insofar as a plaintiff 
can demonstrate that the service provider in question had knowledge of 
and failed to act appropriately with respect to unlawful content posted by 
a third party.91 Because the author suggests that liability would only be 
extended to situations where the service provider allows defamatory 
content or fails to remove it “once notified,”92 service providers would 
have to either (1) implement a reporting system, or (2) actively police 
content. Little consideration is given to the costs associated with both 
options. A service provider would need to employ moderators in 
proportion to the amount of user-generated content. With the staggering 
breadth of daily user submissions on highly trafficked websites, it is 
difficult to imagine most companies being able to employ enough 
moderators to review all the content. Ultimately, a bad faith standard 
would likely prove to be cost-prohibitive to all but the largest of service 
providers dealing in the facilitation of third-party activities. 
Moreover, the author concedes that this method “would necessarily 
result in higher litigation costs for defendants”; although, he argues that 
“courts could still impose . . . sanctions to discourage frivolous claims 
while preventing online entities from ‘abusing’ CDA immunity.”93 Even 
assuming that such sanctions would be sufficient to curtail frivolous 
claims, it is not difficult to imagine that a bad faith exception would 
intimidate several smaller service providers due to the tangible prospect of 
facing extended litigation over whether a particular piece of third-party 
content is “obviously defamatory.”94 
B. Reclassification Based on Engagement in Business as a 
Distributor 
Another author proposes that a solution may be “to treat ISPs and 
websites that conduct business through the Internet as distributors[,]” with 
service providers qualifying for immunity based on their level of Internet 
connectivity.95 He suggests using the three categories discussed in Zippo 
Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.:96 (1) websites that 
clearly do business over the Internet, (2) websites where a user can 
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exchange information with the host, and (3) websites that simply post 
information.97 He envisions that the first category will not qualify for 
§ 230 protection, the second category will not qualify for immunity “if 
there is enough interactivity and the exchanged information is of a 
commercial nature[,]” and the third category will only qualify “if the 
information was not solicited or where the ISPs or websites knew or 
should have known the information was defamatory or against protected 
civil rights.”98 
This approach is focused on addressing the chilling effect of 
widespread liability by only applying liability to service providers with a 
commercial stake in the transaction of third-party content. The author 
argues that “if a website generates income through user provided content 
or if its revenue is based on viewership of third party content,” then it 
should not qualify for § 230 immunity because “[t]hese websites are 
profitable, and the additional cost imposed by distributor liability would 
not cripple their growth.”99 As such, the author contends that this model, 
as applied to Roommates.com, would preserve the Ninth Circuit holding 
that Roommates.com would not qualify for § 230 immunity “because it 
would be classified [under the first category,] as a website clearly doing 
business on the Internet.”100 
However, this method neglects to address liability for third-party 
content on websites operated for non-commercial purposes, and it assumes 
that the majority of offensive third-party content is necessarily tied the 
financial benefit of the service provider. While this method may find 
solvency in instances like Roommates.com where the website clearly 
operates as a business,101 it ignores other service providers that choose not 
to monetize. 
The author predicates his proposal on the assumption that most 
service providers are profitable enough to afford self-regulation, but his 
solution invariably encumbers service providers who do not generate 
enough income from their service to sufficiently reinvest in self-
regulation.102 This solution ignores whether the service provider is actually 
capable of using its decidedly modest income to reinvest in something as 
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resource intensive as self-regulating content. Thus, a message board that 
only generates nominal revenue via advertisements or subscription fees 
would be accepting liability simply for monetizing regardless of how 
much profit it made. At the same time, a non-commercial message board 
that acts as a haven for hate speech would not incur liability, simply 
because it elects not to generate revenue. This disparity incentivizes 
service providers who anticipate the possibility of offensive third-party 
content to either (1) provide their service free of charge or (2) pass on the 
cost of self-regulation to users. The former means that this solution fails 
to address some of the more pernicious instances of service providers 
facilitating defamatory third-party content; the latter means that this 
solution ultimately hurts the market viability of several services, 
potentially hamstringing further innovation and development. 
C. Giving the FHA Effect, Absent Irreconcilable Conflict or 
Legislative Comment 
Finally, one author specifically addresses the issue of whether the 
CDA-created exceptions to FHA liability are valid, by looking at the way 
that federal courts treat other conflicts between two federal statutes.103 
This solution intends to achieve an appropriate balance by attempting to 
give effect to Congress’s stated intentions both when it enacted the CDA 
and the FHA. 
She argues that “the approach taken by federal courts confronting 
potential conflicts between two federal statutes in other contexts suggests 
that both statutes must be given effect if possible[,]”104 citing a case in 
which the Supreme Court evaluated the facial conflict between two pieces 
of federal legislation to determine if one impliedly appealed the other.105 
There, the Court held that “[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a 
specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, 
regardless of the priority of enactment.”106 In instances where two statutes 
can be construed as to permit them to coexist, “it is the duty of the courts, 
absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to 
regard each as effective.”107 
As applied here, she contends that “we should interpret the CDA to 
abrogate the FHA only if there has been a clearly expressed congressional 
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intention of such, or if the substance and goals of the two statutes are such 
that we cannot preserve them both.”108 Ostensibly, such a standard could 
be applied to virtually any federal statute that may come into conflict with 
the CDA. Regarding the conflict between the FHA and CDA, the author 
observes that “a legal regime that allow[s] the Internet to become a safe 
haven for housing discrimination could have disastrous consequences for 
the important goals that Congress put on the national agenda in 1968[,]”109 
when the FHA was codified. She reasons that “Congress could not have 
intended, in [later] passing the CDA, to undermine these monumental 
commitments with nary a discussion of the possible consequences.”110 
Thus, the author posits that silence as to congressional intent to limit the 
reach of the FHA should be interpreted to mean that the CDA does not 
dilute the FHA’s applicability.111 
However, this solution is limited by whether congressional intent in 
any given instance can be reasonably surmised. Furthermore, while there 
is no record of congressional intent as to the CDA’s specific effect on the 
applicability of the FHA, it is disingenuous to say that Congress was 
entirely mute on the broader issue of resolving conflicts between the CDA 
and other federal statutes. In fact, Congress expressly exempts certain 
areas of law, such as intellectual property law and federal criminal laws, 
from the scope of § 230 immunity.112 As such, extrapolating meaning from 
silence as to applicability of the FHA, when Congress explicitly discussed 
other federal statutes, is a precarious endeavor. 
In codifying § 230, Congress stated that one of its policy goals was 
“to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation.”113 Congress further elaborated later in the 
same policy statement that it sought to ensure the “vigorous enforcement 
of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, 
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”114 Altogether, this 
language may indicate congressional intent to favor the CDA in 
irreconcilable conflicts with other legislation, except where the conflicting 
legislation pertains specifically to the enumerated evils of obscenity, 
stalking, and harassment. This language can also be interpreted to mean 
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that Congress did not intend to limit the FHA and similar federal statutes, 
but it instead intended to curtail the applicability of federal laws that would 
otherwise impose liability on service providers for facilitating other types 
of criminal acts. 
Moreover, treating congressional silence as implicit evidence of 
congressional intent may generate confusion amongst service providers as 
to which federal statutes apply to them. Without the resources necessary 
to sift through lengthy legislative histories for evidence of explicit or 
implicit congressional intent, new and innovative service providers may 
be deterred from entering the marketplace. 
IV. EXTENSION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDING 
Extending the holding in Roommates.com should be preferred to 
other alternatives because the holding provides a judicially manageable 
scheme for discerning between distinct types of service providers and 
apportioning liability consistent with the congressional intent of § 230.115 
While service providers should continue to receive immunity from 
liability when passively interacting with third-party content, immunity 
should not extend to service providers who, by making material 
contributions to offensive third-party content, become information content 
providers themselves. Promulgating the scheme articulated in 
Roommates.com would ensure that courts, armed with an effective method 
for categorizing defendants, are consistent in their approach to assigning 
liability. This would in turn ensure that service providers are well-
informed as to the kinds of activities that will compromise their immunity. 
In Roommates.com, the court identified two terms that could be used 
to classify service providers and make future cases more judicially 
manageable: “passive conduits” and “co-developers.”116 The use of these 
terms would create a categorical distinction between service providers that 
merely provide neutral tools and service providers that have “materially 
contribut[ed]”117 to allegedly unlawful content. The former would receive 
§ 230 immunity as a passive conduit for any illicit third-party content; the 
latter would be liable for third-party content as co-developers.118 
The Roommates.com holding does not define a material contribution; 
however, a “material contribution” should be defined as (1) any action on 
the part of the service provider that modifies the substance of third-party 
content, such as to alter its original meaning to turn it from something 
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innocuous into something illicit, and (2) any aspect of a service that 
necessarily obliges users to engage in illicit commentary or actions via the 
service. For example, Roommates.com materially contributed to third-
party content because it required users to list discriminatory preferences.119 
In this way, materiality would be measured in a way consistent with the 
myriad examples articulated by the majority opinion.120 Through those 
illustrations, the majority exemplified a desire to hold service providers 
accountable when they offer tools engineered to make illicit content a 
virtually certain consequence of their use, as well as when service 
providers modify third-party content to the extent that it transforms the 
original meaning of the content.121 
To that end, the proposed definition of “material contribution” would 
ensure that § 230 affords immunity to a wide audience of service providers 
seeking to provide neutral tools, while precluding service providers that 
contribute in a “direct and palpable”122 way to the creation of illicit 
content. Service providers will thus be emboldened to continue developing 
societally beneficial online services, while active participants in the 
creation of offensive content will no longer elude liability due to the 
overbroad application of § 230. 
Applying the standards articulated in Roommates.com to a case like 
Stratton illustrates the propriety of relying upon “material contributions” 
to decide whether § 230 immunity should apply. Under an extension of the 
Roommates.com holding, the defendant in Stratton would receive § 230 
immunity because it did not modify the substance of the offensive third-
party message board posts, nor did any aspect of its service oblige third-
party users to generate offensive content. Moreover, the defendant would 
not be penalized for attempting to engage in self-regulation of third-party 
content, thereby encouraging other service providers to engage in self-
regulation by assuaging any apprehension that they might lose § 230 
immunity by doing so. 
This outcome is better aligned with the congressional intent of § 230 
than probable outcomes that would result from the other proposed 
alternatives discussed in Part III. For example, the defendant in Stratton 
would potentially suffer liability under a bad faith exception regime 
because the defendant engaged in some self-policing of content and “held 
itself out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its 
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computer bulletin boards.”123 This outcome would suggest to other service 
providers that § 230 immunity is best secured by foregoing self-regulation 
entirely to avoid notice of offensive content. 
Similarly, the defendant in Stratton would likely incur liability under 
an approach categorizing service providers based on their engagement in 
online business. Because classification under that type of regime 
necessarily turns on the service provider’s profitability, the defendant in 
Stratton would be held liable for posts on its message board, assuming the 
message board was generating income. This result is problematic because 
it forces service providers to choose between redirecting profits towards 
extensive self-regulation measures or abandoning commercial aspirations 
entirely. Particularly for newer startups, the inability to reliably monetize 
a service without incurring liability may cause innovation to stagnate as 
entrepreneurs see less opportunity for profit. Only established economic 
juggernauts could possibly hope to take on the burden of self-regulation 
without crumbling financially. Comparatively, the method adopted in 
Roommates.com would enable all passive conduits to profit and utilize 
their earnings freely without opening themselves up to liability, allowing 
even modestly sized service providers to find success and contribute to a 
more diverse marketplace of online services. 
While the dissent in Roommates.com prophesizes “doom and gloom 
for countless Internet services[,]” the majority’s holding is consistent with 
the intent of Congress “to preserve the free-flowing nature of Internet 
speech and commerce without unduly prejudicing the enforcement of 
other important state and federal laws.”124 As the majority articulated, 
“[T]he message to website operators is clear: If you don’t encourage illegal 
content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, 
you will be immune.”125 Service providers seeking to create neutral tools 
should feel secure in their ability to operate without fear of incurring 
liability from the actions of third-party users. 
CONCLUSION 
Until the United States Supreme Court offers a definitive answer on 
applying § 230 immunity, it is incumbent upon the circuit courts to 
evaluate the diverse options available to them and to incorporate some 
mechanism for narrowing the scope of § 230 to prevent abuse of the 
considerable immunities afforded by it. Roommates.com should be 
extended to provide that necessary mechanism because it best reflects the 
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congressional motivations that drove the codification of § 230 in the 
aftermath of Stratton. 
The line drawn should not be one based on the service provider’s 
knowledge or intent, as consideration of those factors will tend to 
incentivize service providers to forego attempts at monitoring and self-
regulating offensive content. Nor should liability turn on the financial 
viability of the service in question, as applying liability in this manner 
would penalize well-intentioned service providers that generate a menial 
profit while affording protections to non-profit service providers that 
create safe havens for illicit conduct. 
Rather, liability should turn on whether there was a material 
contribution that implicates the service provider as an active participant in 
the generation of illicit content. A material contribution should be defined 
as (1) any action on the part of the service provider that modifies the 
substance of third-party content, such as to alter its original meaning to 
turn it from something innocuous into something illicit, and (2) any aspect 
of a service that necessarily obliges users to engage in illicit commentary 
or actions via the service. Using material contributions as the determining 
factor affords immunity to all passive creators of neutral tools—such as 
those enumerated by the majority in Roommates.com—and ensures that 
immunity will end at the point where service providers create tools that, 
by their design, obligate third-party users to create offensive material. In 
this way, the “vibrant and competitive free market”126 valued by Congress 
can be preserved, and the treatment of the Internet as a unique venue for 
innovation can continue unfettered by excessive regulation. 
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